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1. Introduction 
 
In his influential anti-relativist treatise, Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian suggests that 
epistemic relativism is committed to a principle he calls ‘Epistemic Pluralism’ (henceforth 
‘EP’) and formulates as follows: 
 
‘There are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic 
systems, but no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is more correct than 
any of the others.’ (2006: 73) 
 
Boghossian claims to find EP for example in Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature (2006: 61). In the relevant pages (322-332) Rorty discusses the controversy 
between Cardinal Bellarmine and Galileo Galilei (henceforth ‘B/G controversy’) over the 
“two chief world systems” as an instance of a clash between incommensurable Kuhnian 
paradigms. Rorty appeals to this case-study in order to convince his readers of two claims. 
First, Bellarmine and Galileo used different ‘grids’ for determining ‘what sorts of evidence 
there could be for statements about the movements of planets’ (1981: 330). And second, 
the conflict between the two grids was too deep for it to be decided by epistemic 
considerations acceptable at the time. For Rorty the dispute therefore did not ‘differ in 
kind’ from the political controversy around 1917 between the liberal-socialist Alexander 
Kerensky and the Bolshevik Vladimir Lenin over such issues as Russia’s involvement in 
World War I, or the need for a radical land-reform (1981: 331). Boghossian takes it that 
Rorty is here defending epistemic relativism by drawing an epistemic-pluralist lesson from 
the B/G-disagreement. 
 
Boghossian’s talk of EP and epistemic systems consisting of epistemic principles is meant 
as a rational reconstruction of Rorty’s position. And yet, ultimately Boghossian is not 
interested in defending Rorty but intent on criticizing both epistemic relativism in general 
and Rorty’s case-study argument in favour of EP in particular. Boghossian seeks to show 
that the rationally-reconstructed version of Rorty’s position is not supported by the B/G-
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dispute. Bellarmine and Galileo did not use ‘fundamentally different, genuine alternative 
epistemic systems’. In developing this criticism, Boghossian is not alone. Markus Seidel 
(2014) seeks to improve on Boghossian’s argument.  
 
In this paper I shall try to undermine Boghossian’s and Seidel’s criticism of Rorty’s 
(alleged) use of the B/G-controversy. I write ‘alleged use’ since I do not think that 
Boghossian’s rational reconstruction of Rorty’s position is adequate. First, I shall suggest 
that even if we leave unchallenged Boghossian’s reconstruction, it is far from clear that his 
and Seidel’s criticism succeeds. Second, I shall argue that Boghossian’s reconstruction 
makes the problematic – ‘isolationist’ – assumption that epistemic systems can be clearly 
separated from non-epistemic systems of beliefs, principles or values. Boghossian’s 
assumption is questionable both in light of what we know about the B/G-controversy, and 
in light of how Rorty renders it. I shall propose replacing Boghossian’s isolationism with a 
form of ‘holism’. And third, and in a similar vein, I shall object to Boghossian’s and Seidel’s 
‘foundationalist’ view of epistemic systems, according to which such systems have a 
permanent and fixed structure of principles, ending with fundamental principles that are 
epistemically independent of all other principles. I shall suggest that a ‘coherentist’ view 
fits much better both with Rorty’s wording and with the historical evidence concerning 
the Galileo trials.  
 
I shall conclude – in a ‘Postcript’ – by offering some fragmentary observations on the 
relationship between the epistemic pluralism at issue in the main bulk of this paper and 
the epistemic pluralism associated primarily with the work of William Alston (1993).  
 
2. Boghossian on Epistemic Systems and the Galileo-Bellarmine Controversy 
 
Boghossian spends a whole chapter of Fear of Knowledge on developing a reconstruction 
and prima-facie defence of epistemological relativism (2006: Ch. 5). The starting point is 
Rorty’s idea of a multitude of Kuhnian ‘paradigms’ or Foucauldian ‘grids’ that are, in some 
sense, ‘equally valid’. Rorty explains his view by reminding us of the B/G-dispute. Cardinal 
Roberto Bellarmine is often alleged to have believed that the Bible is a better source of 
evidence about the heavens than are telescopes. Rorty defends the cardinal against the 
charge of being ‘illogical and unscientific’. According to Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature, Bellarmine had adopted a paradigm or grid of beliefs and principles that was 
fundamentally different from both Galileo’s and our own. For instance, Bellarmine’s grid 
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did not allow for our principled distinction between science and religion. Rorty goes on to 
suggest that there is no absolute vantage point from which our grid can be judged to be 
superior. That we believe our grid to be more ‘objective’ or more ‘rational’ is nothing but 
an accident of history. From within Galileo’s or our system it is epistemically justified to 
believe in the Copernican theory; from within Bellarmine’s epistemic system is it justified 
to stick to the Ptolemaic view (Rorty 1981: 328-329; Boghossian 2006: 63). 
 
Boghossian seeks to make Rorty’s thought more precise. In a first step, Boghossian 
reconstructs in more detail what he takes to be the constituents of epistemic systems, 
that is, epistemic principles. He distinguishes between ‘generation’ and ‘transmission’ 
principles on the one hand, and ‘fundamental’ and ‘derived’ principles on the other hand. 
Generation principles produce justified beliefs on the basis of something that is not itself a 
belief; transmission principles prescribe how to move from one justified belief to another. 
A fundamental principle is one ‘whose correctness cannot be derived from the 
correctness of other epistemic principles’ (2006: 67). This contrasts with derived 
principles. Here are examples of the four categories: 
 
‘(Observation) [a fundamental generation principle] For any observational 
proposition p, if it visually seems to S that p and circumstantial conditions D 
obtain, then S is prima facie justified in believing p.’ (2006: 64) 
 
‘(Deduction) [a fundamental transmission principle] If S is justified in believing p 
and p fairly obviously entails q, then S is justified in believing q.’ (2006: 66) 
 
‘(Observation-dog) [a derived generation principle] If it visually appears to S that 
there is a dog in front of him, and circumstantial conditions D obtain, then S is 
prima facie justified in believing that there is a dog in front of him.’ (2006: 64) 
 
‘(Modus Ponens-rain) [a derived transmission principle] If S justifiably believes 
that it will rain tomorrow, and justifiably believes that if it rains tomorrow the 
streets will be wet tomorrow, S is justified in believing that the streets will be wet 
tomorrow.’ (2006: 66) 
 
Finally, Boghossian also proposes a formulation of Bellarmine’s central principle: 
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‘(Revelation) For certain propositions p, including propositions about the heavens, 
believing p is prima facie justified if p is the revealed word of God as claimed by 
the Bible.’ (2006: 69) 
 
Attributing this principle to Bellarmine might be supported the fact that he defended 
Ptolemy’s system with passages from the Bible like ‘The words “The sun rises and the sun 
sets, and hurries back to where it rises, etc.” were those of Solomon, who not only spoke 
by divine inspiration but was a man wise above all others …’ (Bellarmine, 1615)  
 
Having introduced and clarified epistemic principles and systems, Boghossian proceeds to 
formulating more explicitly what he takes to be Rorty’s argument in favour of epistemic 
relativism. This reconstruction is not of interest to us here. In this paper I am only 
concerned with Boghossian’s claim that it is wrong to think that the B/G-conflict is a case 
to which EP applies.  
 
For EP to apply to the B/G-controversy, the two men’s epistemic systems would have to 
be “fundamentally different”. (Or, since Boghossian assumes throughout that Galileo and 
‘we’ have the same system, Bellarmine’s system would have to be fundamentally 
different from our own.) In order for Bellarmine’s system to qualify as fundamentally 
different from ours or Galileo’s, Boghossian proposes that his system must contain at 
least one fundamental epistemic principle which we do not recognise. And here the 
obvious candidate is Revelation.  
 
At this point in the dialectic Boghossian switches from exposition and reconstruction to 
criticism. He argues against a fundamental difference between Galileo’s (or our) and 
Bellarmine’s epistemic systems. He does so by denying that Revelation is a fundamental 
principle even for Bellarmine. Boghossian reasons as follows. If Revelation were 
fundamental then it would trump Observation with respect to some statements about the 
heavens (e.g. Jupiter has moons) but not with respect to others (e.g. there are clouds in 
the sky). Here Boghossian rightly takes for granted that the cardinal uses his eyes for 
determining the degree of cloudiness. This is bad news for the relativist, Boghossian 
announces: the proposed division of labour between Revelation and Observation – 
Revelation for the stars, Observation for the clouds – is epistemologically unmotivated 
and therefore arbitrary. And thus the epistemic relativist faces a dilemma. First horn: If 
she treats Revelation as fundamental for Bellarmine, and as occasionally trumping 
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Observation in an arbitrary fashion, then she is renders his epistemic system incoherent 
and in consequence open to criticism. In other words, she then has every reason to give 
up her relativistic take on his system. Second horn: If the relativist instead seeks to 
remove the incoherence by ‘downgrading’ Revelation to a mere derived principle – a 
principle governed in its range of application by fundamental principles – then she has lost 
the right to count Bellarmine’s system as fundamentally different from Galileo’s (or our 
own).  
 
Boghossian himself opts for the second alternative by suggesting a way in which 
Revelation might have been derived from more fundamental principles: 
 
‘… we had better regard his [i.e. Bellarmine’s] system as differing from ours only 
in some derived sense, attributing to him the view that there is evidence, of a 
perfectly ordinary sort, that the Holy Scripture is the revealed world of the 
Creator of the Universe. And it is only natural for someone with that belief to 
place a great deal of stock in what it has to say about the heavens …’ (2006: 104-
5) 
 
This is a little sketchy but presumably Boghossian is submitting that Bellarmine’s religious 
beliefs in general, and his belief in the Bible in particular, are due (primarily) to testimony, 
observation and inference to the best explanation. All these are governed by fundamental 
epistemic principles, principles that are parts of both Bellarmine’s and our secular 
epistemic systems. Once Bellarmine’s religious belief, and his belief in the Bible as the 
word of God, are in place, he indeed has reason to also accept Revelation as a further 
principle. And yet, without the more fundamental principles, Revelation could not have 
been motivated.  
 
Finally, since Bellarmine’s system differs from Galileo’s and our own only slightly, and only 
with respect to one derived principle, there can be a rational debate over the justifiability 
of Revelation between him, Galileo and us. The question is simply whether there is 
‘evidence of a perfectly ordinary sort for believing that what was written down in some 
book by a large number of people over a vast period of time, internal inconsistencies and 
all, is really the revealed word of the Creator’ (2006: 105). 
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3.  Seidel’s Further Development of Boghossian’s Argument 
 
Seidel (2014) follows Boghossian’s lead but tries to make his ally’s main arguments more 
precise. He does so by formulating what he takes to be two ‘intuitive’ criteria for 
concluding that given epistemic principles are not fundamental.  
 
The first such criterion Seidel calls ‘Instance’. Assume we have one epistemic system, ES1, 
with norm N’; and another epistemic system, ES2, with norm N’’. Allow further that N’ and 
N’’ are instances of a further norm N that is part of both ES1 and ES2. In such a situation 
Seidel thinks we would all find it intuitive that ES1 and ES2 are not fundamentally different 
epistemic systems, at least not in virtue of their differing with respect to N’ and N’’. Seidel 
explains and justifies the principle with the following example: ES1 is the epistemic system 
of Platonism; ES2 is the epistemic system of Aristotelianism; N’ is: ‘If Plato says p, then I 
am prima facie justified in believing that p’; N’’ is ‘If Aristotle says p, then I am prima facie 
justified in believing that p’. N’ and N’’ are instances of N: ‘If an ancient philosopher says 
p, then I am prima facie justified in believing that p.’ Belief B’, occurring in ES1 but not in 
ES2, is: ‘Plato is an ancient philosopher’; and B’’, occurring in ES2 but not in ES1, is : 
‘Aristotle is an ancient philosopher.’ Seidel’s verdict: However different the Platonists’ and 
the Aristotelians’ beliefs or derived norms may be, ‘we would not say’ that they have 
‘fundamentally different epistemic systems’ (Seidel 2014: 169). 
 
Seidel’s second principle is called ‘Derive’. Assume we have again ES1 with norm N’ and 
ES2 with norm N’’. This time N’ and N’’ can both be derived from a further norm N that is 
part of both ES1 and ES2. Here too Seidel is confident that we would deem it intuitive that 
ES1 and ES2 are not fundamentally different epistemic systems, at least not in virtue of 
their differing with respect to N’ and N’’. Seidel uses the same example as before except 
that N is now: ‘If an epistemologist says that p, then I am prima facie justified in believing 
that p.’ B’ is: ‘An epistemologist told me that: “If Plato says p, then I am prima facie 
justified in believing that p.”’ And B’’ mutatis mutandis for the Aristotle. Seidel maintains 
that we have here no ‘fundamentally different epistemic systems.’ We have different 
beliefs, different derived norms, but the same fundamental norms. 
 
Following in Boghossian’s footsteps, Seidel applies his principles to Bellarmine’s epistemic 
system. To make his case, Seidel contrasts Bellarmine’s Revelation with a principle he calls 
Science:  
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‘(Science) For certain propositions p, including propositions about the heavens, 
believing p is prima facie justified if  p  is included in the best physics books 
available.’ (Seidel 2014: 175) 
 
How does Revelation relate to Science? Seidel argues that both are instances of, or 
derived from, a more fundamental principle we might call ‘Reliability of Books’: 
 
‘(Reliability of Books) For certain propositions p, including propositions about the 
heavens, believing  p is prima facie justified if  p  is included in books who have 
been assessed as highly reliable by appropriate experts.’  
 
The upshot is of course that since Science and Revelation are both instances of, or derived 
from Relialibity of Books, they are not to be taken as fundamental. And hence the 
relativist case for EP collapses (2014: 177).  
 
4.   Mystical Perception 
 
I have more than one worry concerning these arguments. Some relate to Boghossian’s 
and Seidel’s interpretation of what was at issue between Bellarmine and Galileo, others 
focus on their static and crystalline conception of epistemic systems.  But I begin with an 
objection that grants the two authors this (problematic) conception.  
 
Consider an epistemic principle I propose calling ‘Mystical Perception’: 
 
(Mystical Perception): If it seems to S that God is telling him that p; and if S is not 
already fully committed to atheism; and if circumstantial conditions D obtain, then 
S is prima facie justified in believing that God is telling him that p.  
 
Mystical Perception is not part of my epistemic system but it is a fundamental principle in 
the epistemic systems of others. And at least some of these others cannot be easily 
dismissed as fools or religious fanatics. After all, the most detailed defence of the principle 
of mystical perception comes from the pen of the distinguished epistemologist William 
Alston who wrote almost four-hundred pages on this topic (Alston 1991). Amongst other 
things, Alston argues in great detail that mystical perception has parallels with sensory 
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perception in that neither have noncircular demonstrations of their reliability; both are 
self-supporting;  both have over-rider systems; both are sometimes inconsistent; and both 
cohere with other epistemic practices. To my mind the argument that there is no 
noncircular demonstration of the reliability of mystical perception makes a good case for 
treating it as a fundamental principle – in Alston’s epistemic system.  
 
Seidel disagrees (in response to Kusch (draft)). As Seidel has it, mystical perception and 
sensory perception are both instances of perception; and hence the principle of Instance 
applies, and rules out the option of treating Mystical Perception as fundamental (2014: 
167).  I am not convinced. It is true of course that in some sense mystical perception has 
always been modelled on sensory perception. That is after all why we call mystical 
perception ‘mystical perception’. But it is not obvious to me that we should take our 
epistemic guidance from such vague analogies. It also is not clear to me how we should 
think of perception once we have abstracted from both the ‘mystical’ and the ‘sensory’.  
In any case, I cannot see why these considerations should be weightier than Alston’s 
argument to the effect that mystical perception has no noncircular demonstration of its 
reliability.  
 
Can Seidel’s argument be improved? Rather than saying that Mystical Perception and 
Sensory Perception are instances of Perception why not say that Mystical Perception and 
Sensory Perception are instances of a principle called ‘Seeming’: 
 
(Seeming) If it seems to S that p, and circumstantial conditions D obtain, then S is 
prima facie justified in believing that p.  
 
It obviously is right to say that Mystical Perception and Sensory Perception (as well as 
some other principles) can be construed as instances of Seeming. But I am not convinced 
that this fact tells against the possibility of fundamentally different epistemic systems. The 
problem is that if the principles common to different epistemic systems become too 
abstract, too thin, then it is no longer plausible to assume that the common principles 
prevent the respective epistemic systems from being, intuitively, fundamentally different. 
At least if we mean by ‘intuitively, fundamentally different’ something like the idea that to 
switch from one system to the other would feel like epistemic-cum-metaphysical trauma, 
dislocation, or revolution in thought.  
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Does Seeming rule out epistemic relativism? One might think so on the following grounds. 
Epistemic principles differ in what they regard as appropriate conditions for a seeming to 
confer justification.  These differences trace back to factual beliefs about when seemings 
track the truth. These beliefs can be tested. Moreover, if two incompatible principles 
(belonging to two different epistemic systems) involve contradictory beliefs about which 
seemings are truth-tracking, what sense can be made of the relativist’s claim that the two 
principle could be equally valid?  
 
To answer this worry the epistemic relativist needs to insist again that the testing of 
factual beliefs does never happen in isolation but only against the background of specific 
epistemic systems. Does Revelation enable us to track the truth? That depends on what 
we mean by ‘truth’ and what we mean by ‘tracking’.  Moreover, remember that Alston 
argues that neither mystical nor sensory perception have noncircular demonstrations of 
their reliability. If Alston is right, then the fact that both are instances of seeming does not 
show that they can be tested and compared in a neutral way. 
 
5. Rethinking the Role of Revelation the Galileo-Bellarmine Controversy 
 
Up to this point I have challenged Boghossian’s and Seidel’s arguments without 
scrutinizing their readings of Rorty or their rendering of the dispute between Bellarmine 
and Galileo. I now turn to that latter task.  
 
Open any standard historical account of the episode, and invariably you will find 
something like the following observation: ‘This was a controversy involving issues of 
methodology, epistemology, and theology as well as astronomy, physics, and cosmology’ 
(Finocchiaro 2005: 1). Authors influenced by the sociology of knowledge add period-
specific relationships between patrons and courtiers; traditions of instrument-making; the 
tensions between different religious orders; the politics of the papal court; the political 
problems between Spain and the Vatican; the Thirty-Year War; and much else besides 
(Biagioli 1993, 2006).  
 
In reducing the episode to a clash over the epistemic status of one epistemic principle, 
Revelation, Boghossian strips away pretty much all of this complexity. In his 
reconstruction, all non-epistemic considerations are set aside as irrelevant. In the process, 
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religion is turned into an epistemic system; and epistemic principles are treated as 
isolated or isolatable entities with fixed implications.  
 
Boghossian’s sketchy and quick reconstruction has its costs. One casualty is the interesting 
fact that Galileo and Bellarmine did not disagree over Revelation as such – only over its 
scope. As we saw above, as Boghossian has it, Bellarmine’s belief in geocentrism resulted 
from an application of Revelation. And since Galileo rejected Revelation he was free to 
believe in Copernicanism on the basis of empirical evidence. This interpretation of the 
episode contradicts the best recent scholarship. (Boghossian’s only reference is Giorgio de 
Santillana’s The Crime of Galileo (1955).1)  
 
To cut a long story short, both Bellarmine and Galileo accepted the following tripartite 
distinction between propositions about the natural world:  
 
(i) propositions about the natural world that have been demonstrated (by our natural 
lights, that is, by reason);  
(ii) propositions about the natural world that in principle are demonstrable, but that have 
not yet been demonstrated; and  
(iii) propositions about the natural world that are beyond demonstration (Blackwell 1991: 
3328).  
 
Consider propositions in these three categories that, given a literal reading, seem to 
contradict the Bible. Bellarmine and Galileo agreed on what to do about cases in (i): in 
such cases, the Biblical passages were to be re-interpreted figuratively in such a way that 
they would come out true, and that they would not contradict the demonstrated 
proposition. This procedure was motivated by a belief, shared by Bellarmine and Galileo, 
that the Bible – a text allegedly dictated by the Holy Spirit – spoke the truth and nothing 
but the truth. Galileo and Bellarmine also agreed on how to react to category (iii): when 
such propositions contradicted the Bible, then they had to be rejected as false and 
heretical. In this case, revelation invariably trumped philosophical speculation.  
 
                                                           
1 The following studies can be regarded as constituting or reflecting (in good part) the 
state of the art on Galileo and his conflict with the Catholic Church: Biagioli (1993, 2006), 
Blackwell (1991), Finocchiaro (1980, 2010), Drake (1978), Heilbron (2010), Koyre (1978), 
Machamer (ed.) (1998), McMullin (2005), Redondi (1987), Renn (2002), Wallace (1984). 
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To repeat, Bellarmine and Galileo both rejected Revelation for category (i), and they both 
accepted Revelation for category (iii). The point of contention was what to do about 
category (ii). Here Bellarmine and the Church insisted that, when such propositions 
contradicted a literal reading of the Bible, then they had to be considered false and 
heretical. This did not, however, preclude using these propositions (and the theories to 
which they belonged) as useful fictions. But no realist commitments to these propositions 
were acceptable. Galileo differed. He urged the Church not to treat such propositions as 
false and heretical. This proposal was of course inseparable from Galileo’s belief that 
Copernicanism was an instance of category (ii). In other words, Galileo accepted that the 
truth of heliocentrism had not yet been demonstrated. Nevertheless, he asked that the 
Bible – read literally – should not be the yardstick for judging Copernicanism. Instead the 
Church ought to suspend judgement until a demonstration for either Copernicanism or 
the Ptolemaic system had been found. For Bellarmine (and later for Pope Urban VIII) this 
position was unacceptable. But this was not only because they rejected Galileo’s 
rendering of category (ii) as problematic; the deeper reason was that they likely 
considered the question of the correct “world system” to belong into category (iii). 
 
Why is all this important? Boghossian sees Bellarmine’s and Galileo’s judgements about 
geocentrism as guided by epistemic rules like Revelation (in Bellarmine’s case) or 
Observation plus Inference to the Best Explanation (in Galileo’s case). Someone who had 
adopted Revelation had to end up opposing Copernicanism; someone who had instead 
adopted Observation and Inference to the Best Explanation could opt for Copernicanism. 
My brief excursion into the historical scholarship shows that this reading of the event is 
mistaken. It was not the adoption or rejection of Revelation that made the difference – 
both Bellarmine and Galileo accepted it. But they differed in how they interpreted this 
rule. Their interpretations differed with respect to the categories (i), (ii) and (iii); and they 
differed concerning the proper position of Copernicanism as falling into either (ii) or (iii). 
Historians have shown us in great detail the great variety of considerations that 
influenced both streams of judgements: to repeat, the context of the Counter-
Reformation, relationships between patrons and courtiers; traditions of instrument-
making; the tensions between different religious orders; the politics of the papal court; 
the political problems between Spain and the Vatican; the Thirty-Year War; and much else 
besides (Biagioli 1993, 2006). Interpretative decisions made in light of such complex and 
intricate considerations cannot be reduced to a simple – or even a complicated – rule.  
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The Areas of Agreement and Disagreement between Galileo and Bellarmine  
 
We can get at the same complexity also via a different route, that is, by dissecting more 
carefully the areas of agreement and disagreement of Bellarmine’s and Galileo’s views. 
Again I am taking my lead from historical scholarship of the episode (Blackwell 1991, 
McMullin 2005). I do not here have the space to cite the textual evidence these authors 
put forward in support of their historical claims. But it is readily available in these two 
sources in particular. 
 
There was substantial agreement between Galilei and Bellarmine over many important 
scientific and theological issues: 
 
(I)  The Bible is the word of God. 
(II)  The Bible cannot be in conflict with natural philosophy.  
(III)  No ‘demonstration’ (in natural philosophy) can trump the Bible in ‘matters 
of faith or morals’. 
(IV)  In cases other than (III), when a demonstration contradicts the literal 
meaning of a Biblical passage, the latter must be reinterpreted figuratively.  
(V)  Concerning issues where no demonstration is possible, and where Bible 
passages apply, the latter are to be believed. 
(VI)  One should not prematurely commit the Church to interpretations of 
difficult Biblical passages, lest these interpretations later conflict with 
demonstrations. 
(VII)  At least sometimes it is appropriate to support cosmological views with 
Biblical passages. 
(VIII)  Copernican theory does an excellent job of ‘saving the phenomena’. 
(IX)  To date no ‘demonstration’ of Copernicanism has been offered. 
(X) Revelation. 
 
Bellarmine’s and Galileo’s agreement on (X) Revelation is clear in light of (III), (V) and (VII). 
Turning from agreement to disagreement, the following propositions were all believed by 
Bellarmine but denied by Galileo:  
 
(i)  Copernicanism contradicts common sense. 
(ii)  The natural-philosophical case for Copernicanism is weak.  
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(iii)  Mathematical astronomy (Copernicus, Galileo) cannot decide issues in 
physical astronomy (Aristotle). 
(iv)  The case for Aristotelian scholastic philosophy is strong. 
(v)  The consensus of the ‘Church Fathers’ on Biblical literalism is important. 
(vi)  ‘Matters of faith or morals’ include the belief that God is the truth-telling 
author of the Bible. 
(vii)  In assessing the Bible’s cosmological claims, we need not give much weight 
to the fact that its addressees include the uneducated. 
(viii)  The same is true concerning the Bible’s primary concern with human 
salvation. 
(ix)  When a demonstrable, but as yet undemonstrated, belief contradicts a 
literal reading of a Biblical passage, it is right to stick to the latter. 
(x)  According to the Bible, Solomon was the wisest of men. Thus his beliefs 
cannot have been contrary to what is demonstrable. Solomon thought that 
the Sun moves around the Earth. Solomon’s belief is crucial cosmological 
testimony.  
 
Isolationism vs. Holism; Foundationalism vs. Coherentism 
 
Assume the historians of the episode are roughly on the right track regarding the above. 
What follows for the concerns of this paper?  
 
The first thing to note is that Boghossian and Seidel are wrong to present the clash 
between Galileo and Bellarmine as one between a secular scientist (like ‘us’) and an 
unscientific religious believer. The conflict was one between two religious believers, both 
of whom had considerable knowledge of contemporary ‘natural philosophy’ – that is, 
what we today would classify as ‘natural science’ and what we today would call 
‘epistemology and metaphysics of natural science’. 
 
Second, although we could rephrase the listed propositions as rules, this would be a bit 
artificial. At least it is not clear which rendering – the doxastic-descriptive or the 
normative – was more fundamental for the historical actors. This suggests that it is at best 
one-sided to insist that the “systems” of natural philosophy consisted only of norms or 
principles rather than beliefs; or that the more fundamental contents of an epistemic 
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system are norms. This position is not defended by Boghossian and Seidel in any way; it is 
simply assumed to be correct.  
 
Third, in Bellarmine’s and Galileo’s respective “systems of beliefs and principles” 
(‘systemsb&p’ from now on), epistemological issues were tightly woven together with 
concerns in theology, natural philosophy, logic, common sense, metaphysics, and 
epistemology. Take (IX) in an epistemic-normative format:  
 
‘Do not cease believing a literal reading of a Biblical passage just because it is 
contradicted by a demonstrable but as yet undemonstrated belief.’  
 
To understand and apply this principle, the epistemic subject needed to appreciate: what 
counts as a literal reading of a Biblical passage; this was far from straightforward since 
there existed competing theological schools of Biblical hermeneutics, each with its own 
criteria of the literal); what was meant by a ‘demonstration’ (this was of course a key term 
of Aristotelian epistemology and metaphysics, variously interpreted by different Church 
Fathers and philosophers); or how to determine that a demonstration was possible even 
though it had not yet been carried out (this question was tied to different views on the 
metaphysics of modalities and theological premises). 
 
We can of course always insist on ‘filtering out’ the epistemological from the 
metaphysical, the theological or the ethical. With enough patience and ingenuity we can 
often come up with a rational reconstruction or idealization of a given systemb&p such that 
only the epistemological side of a given systemb&p is salient. But we should be clear that to 
analyze a rational reconstruction of Bellarmine’s systemb&p is not to analyze Bellarmine’s 
systemb&p. Conclusions drawn about the former are not automatically adequate to the 
latter. In other words, a rational reconstruction imposes our criteria of rationality on a 
systemb&p that – absent our reconstruction – may well encode a different form of 
rationality.  
 
This is the point where it seems useful to introduce a distinction that captures where I 
differ from Boghossian and Seidel. I am referring to the distinction between ‘isolationism’ 
and ‘holism’. The isolationist concerning systemsb&p deems it possible and fruitful to filter 
out, with respect to such systems, the epistemic from all other dimensions. The holist 
finds this distorting and unhelpful, even as an idealization. I submit that the historical 
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material adduced above makes at least a prima-facie case for holism. After all, it shows 
that both Bellarmine and Galileo thought and reasoned in ways that resist a separating 
out of epistemic, metaphysical, natural-philosophical and theological concepts and 
principles.    
 
Recall also that Boghossian’s starting point is Rorty’s discussion of the disagreement 
between Bellarmine and Galileo. Boghossian reconstructs Rorty as an isolationist. But it 
seems that a holist reading would fit much better with Rorty’s train of thought. Rorty’s 
main point is to insist that it is anachronistic to evaluate the disagreement between the 
two sixteenth/seventeenth-centuries figures in terms of what we today call ‘scientific’ 
criteria. The sharp distinction between Bellarmine’s (allegedly illegitimate) theological 
considerations and Galileo’s (allegedly legitimate) scientific reasons, is, Rorty insists, a 
product of the ‘grid’ that emerged in the ‘later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ and 
this grid ‘was not there to be appealed to in the early seventeenth century, at the time 
that Galileo was on trial’ (1981: 330). For thinkers in the early-seventeenth century there 
was no such distinction; what we wish to separate for them formed a unity.  
 
Note also that Rorty uses the Foucauldian concept of ‘grid’ instead of ‘epistemic system’. 
‘Grid’ is variously used as a translation for Foucault’s concepts ‘épistème’, ‘dispositif’ or 
‘grille d'intelligibilité’. In each case Foucault is at pains to pick out a (by our, later eyes) 
heterogeneous sets of factors, ranging from the abstractly theoretical through 
architectural arrangements to forms of power (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, Gutting 1989, 
Kusch 1991). Let us also remember that Rorty’s whole discussion occurs in a section 
entitled “Kuhn and Incommensurability”. And scientific paradigms qua “disciplinary 
matrices” are constituted by epistemological, metaphysical, mathematical and scientific 
elements. 
 
Fourth, my insistence above that both Bellarmine and Galileo accepted Revelation should 
not be read as support for Boghossian and Seidel’s contention according to which the 
B/G-dispute took place on the basis of ‘a common epistemic system’. Even in the absence 
of clear identity conditions for ‘epistemic systems’ or ‘systemb&p’ it seems forced to 
suggest that two people can disagree over (i) to (x) above and yet do so on the basis of 
one and the same system. At least it is unclear what purpose talk of systems can serve, if 
it does not roughly track differences between the kinds of bodies of belief as different as 
Galileo’s and Bellarmine’s.  
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The assessment that Bellarmine and Galileo had different systemb&p can be supported by 
the observation that it is hard to imagine either men mounting a rational argument for 
their respective view that would have convinced their opponent. This, in any case, is the 
assessment of one of the leading contemporary historians and philosophers of Galileo’s 
trial of 1616 (McMullin 2005). Bellarmine and Galileo each had a coherent system of 
beliefs and principles, and neither could rationally force the other to change their 
assessment of Copernicanism. Moreover, each side could comfortably account for what 
the other side counted as evidence. And there was no neutral vantage point from which 
one could decide which of the two webs of beliefs was right. Rorty agrees: this is why he 
suggests that it needed “three hundred years of rhetoric” to convince us that Galileo was 
right (1981: 330). 
 
Fifth, and finally, Boghossian’s and Seidel’s rendering is not only ‘isolationist’ but also 
‘foundationalist’. They insist on a strict distinction between fundamental or underived, 
and non-fundamental or derived epistemic principles. Observation or Inference to the Best 
Explanation are fundamental, Revelation is not. And Revelation is not fundamental since 
other epistemic principles must have played a role in its rational adoption.  
 
My central misgiving in this. As epistemologists using the history of science, we must be 
clear about what we are trying to do. Are we trying to identify the systems of beliefs and 
norms of our actors – as these actors understood these systems – or are we attempting to 
construct, in our terms, a maximally abstract and parsimonious system of principles from 
which we can derive, or in terms of which we can justify, our actors’ normative 
judgements? Note that these two ways of proceeding come with two different ways of 
understanding ‘fundamentality’ or ‘derivation’: if we go by the actors’ categories, a 
principle is fundamental if the actors do not regard it as derived; if we go by our analysts’ 
categories, a principle is fundamental if we – within our constructed parsimonious system 
– would not derive it. It seems to me obvious from what I have already quoted from 
Rorty, that he is opting for the actors’ categories. This is after all the whole point of his 
warning of illicit attempts to condemn Bellarmine by standards that were ‘not there to be 
appealed to in the early seventeenth century’.   
 
And yet, if we go with actors’ categories then it is just not clear how we should divide up 
the principles involved into the more or less fundamental.  Bellarmine accepted (I) to (X) 
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and (i) to (x). Galileo endorses (I) to (X) and the negations of (i) to (x). But it is difficult if 
not impossible to decide which of these various beliefs were derived from which others. It 
rather seems that the respective beliefs formed two sets, webs or systems, such that 
Galileo regarded the one, and Bellarmine the other, as coherent. And depending on the 
specific challenge they faced from specific opponents at different times, the cardinal and 
the courtier would take different paths through their respective webs. If this is roughly on 
the right track, then it seems that we should replace foundationalism with coherentism. 
And this is of course fully in line with Rorty’s own insistence on giving up an 
‘epistemologically centered “foundational” philosophy’ (1981: 329).2  
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper I have argued for the following propositions. Even if Boghossian’s and 
Seidel’s fundamentalist and isolationist rendering of epistemic systems were right, their 
criticism of EP in light of the B/G-controversy would not be decisive. I offered the 
epistemic principle of Mystical Perception (as studied and justified by William Alston 
(1991)) as an example of a fundamental principle that might occur in one epistemic 
system but not in another. More principally, the central intuition pump or case study 
behind Boghossian’s and Seidel’s reasoning – Rorty’s interpretation of the B/G-dispute – 
does not justify the foundationalism and isolationism that characterizes Boghossian’s and 
Seidel’s theorizing about epistemic systems and epistemic relativism. Moreover, this 
observation seems apt both as far as Rorty’s interpretation of the B/G-dispute is 
concerned, and as far as the currently best historical scholarship of the episode is in 
question. Rorty and the best historical scholarship suggest a coherentist and holist 
rendering. 
                                                           
2 Some provisos are worth noting. First, although both Boghossian and Seidel seem to 
commit to a foundationalism of epistemic principles, Seidel’s two criteria of ‘Instance’ and 
‘Derive’ are not conclusive evidence for foundationalism on their own. It is Seidel’s 
general agreement with the way Boghossian sets up epistemic systems that is conclusive. 
Second, it is not clear whether Boghossian’s and Seidel’s analysis of the B/G-controversy 
necessarily requires a foundationalist (rather than a coherentist) conception of epistemic 
systems. After all, even the coherentist can allow that some epistemic principles are more 
fundamental, closer to the centre of the web, than others. Even on a coherentist 
rendering of epistemic systems Boghossian and Seidel could insist that Revelation is less 
fundamental than Observation. Note though that this would force Boghossian and Seidel 
to change their definition of what makes two epistemic systems fundamentally different. 
And the question remains why we should accept the claim with that respect to each and 
every dispute over epistemic principles we are able to find more fundamental principles in 
terms of which the dispute can be rationally resolved.  
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If I am right about all this – admittedly a big ‘if’ – what follows for epistemic relativism in 
general and epistemic pluralism in particular? Needless to say, very little ‘follows’ in any 
strict sense of ‘following’. And yet, perhaps my argument at least suggests the following 
hypotheses as worthy of further investigation. First, of all, the relativist position seems 
able to survive Boghossian’s and Seidel’s specific onslaughts. Furthermore, formulating 
the relativist position in terms of holism and coherentism is more promising than 
rendering it in terms of isolationism and foundationalism. It is, in any case, noteworthy 
that card-carrying relativists like Rorty or the advocates of the “Strong Programme” in the 
sociology of scientific knowledge (Barnes, Bloor, Henry 1996) have favoured the holist-
coherentist formulation.  
 
Shifting to a holist-coherentist version of relativism demands of course a re-thinking of EP: 
 
‘There are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic 
systems, but no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is more correct than 
any of the others.’ (Boghossian 2006: 73) 
 
As it stands, this formulation – as well as the related criterion for ‘fundamental difference’ 
– is tied too closely to Boghossian’s foundationalism and isolationism. We do well to 
replace it with a principles that befits holism and coherentism. The B/G-dispute e.g. might 
be taken to motivate a principle of ‘scientific pluralism’. It is broader in scope than EP 
since it does not seek to filter out the epistemic domain. But it is also more specific in that 
it homes in on one important realm, namely science (and its predecessor, ‘natural 
philosophy’):  
 
(Scientific pluralism) There are some fundamentally different, genuine alternative 
systemsb&p in the sciences. The fundamental difference between two systems S1 and 
S2 is not determined by fundamental principles appearing in S1 and not in S2 but by 
the difficulty of imaging a rational proponent of S1 convincing a rational proponent of 
S2 to switch her allegiance from S2 to S1. We have a fundamental difference between 
two systems when a switch would feel like an epistemic-cum-metaphysical trauma, 
dislocation or revolution in thought (cf. van Fraassen 2002).  
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Postscript: Two Forms of Epistemic Pluralism 
 
Contemporary philosophers use the label “epistemic pluralism” for two rather different 
views. One is at issue in the paper above. The other is addressed by most authors in this 
collection and was first sketched in William P. Alston’s little classic, “Epistemic Desiderata” 
(1993). Alston argues against the hope of finding the one and only correct account of 
epistemic justification. Instead he urges epistemologists to focus their attention on a 
variety of different ‘epistemic desiderata’, such as ‘coherence’, ‘reliability’, or ‘cognitive 
accessibility’. It is natural to go one step beyond Alston by suggesting that different 
epistemic desiderata apply in different areas of discourse. (Similar steps have been 
suggested in the related but different realm of truth pluralism (cf. e.g. Wright 1992).)   
 
How do Alston’s pluralism and Boghossian’s pluralism relate to one another? Perhaps 
surprisingly this question has not to date been systematically discussed. One initially 
tempting idea for distinguishing between the two forms of pluralism is to point to Alston’s 
rejection of what he calls ‘latitudinarianism’ concerning epistemic desiderata. The 
latitudinarian is happy to let a thousand epistemic desiderata bloom, without scrutiny and 
evaluation. Alston’s position is different. He holds that some of the conditions previously 
proposed as epistemically valuable ‘may be eliminated as unattainable (or not sufficiently 
attainable), while others may be plainly more important than others’ (1993: 543). In other 
words, Alston is very much concerned with the evaluation of theories concerning 
epistemic desiderata. And this invites the thought that latitudinarianism is really just 
another word for relativism, and that in rejecting the former, Alston has also rejected the 
latter.  
 
On closer inspection, however, it turns out that the ‘tempting idea’ works only as long as 
we commit the epistemic relativist to abstaining altogether from the epistemic evaluation 
of epistemic systems or desiderata. And yet, it is not obvious that the relativist needs to 
apply her “equal validity” thesis so widely. Boghossian’s pluralism says that there are 
‘many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems’—but that still 
leaves the option of rejecting some candidate alternatives as epistemically problematic in 
some way.  
 
A different suggestion for distinguishing between the two forms of epistemic pluralism (a 
suggestion first put to me by Annalisa Coliva) builds on the notion that different epistemic 
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desiderata apply in different domains.3 This might make the different epistemic 
desiderata compatible with one another. The relativist pluralism studied by Boghossian is 
different. It is the view that there is a plurality of epistemic systems or desiderata that are 
not compatible and yet in some sense equally valid. This suggestion seems to me to be on 
the right track, but needs a bit more development. Three points seem especially 
important to me.  
 
First, relativism is typically invoked when we face (what appear to be) irresolvable 
disagreements. Boghossian’s book is a case in point. On Boghossian’s rendering, Galileo 
and Bellarmine are disagreeing over which epistemic principles to apply in the study of 
the heavens. They are disagreeing over issues in one and the same domain. And the 
relativist (in Boghossian’s reconstruction) seeks to explain the irresolvable character of 
the disagreement by attributing different “fundamental” epistemic principles (and 
thereby fundamentally different epistemic systems) to the two men. Clearly, if we 
construe Alstonian pluralism as allowing for different epistemic desiderata in different 
domains (only), then the disagreement between Galileo and Bellarmine is not a case on 
which Alston’s pluralism can be fruitfully brought to bear.  
 
Second, it is nevertheless illuminating to relate Alston’s distinction between different 
epistemic desiderata to relativistic pluralism as reconstructed by Boghossian. This is the 
point where we might separate Alston’s original proposal from the further idea according 
to which different epistemic desiderata apply only in different domains. For Bellarmine 
‘accordance with scripture (literally understood)’ was an epistemic desideratum for claims 
about the natural world, including the heavens; for Galileo it was not. This is of course just 
to offer a translation of “epistemic-principle” talk into “epistemic-desiderata” lingo. But 
the fact that such translation is easy and natural, suggests that there is an overlap of 
concerns between the epistemologists studying Alstonian pluralism, and the 
epistemologists concerned with relativistic pluralism: both have an interest in discovering 
just how many plausible epistemic goods (desiderata, principles) there are, and how they 
relate to one another.  
 
                                                           
3 I tentatively go along with this proposal here, though I am sceptical whether it can 
ultimately be made to work. Can we neatly assign different desiderata – like coherence or 
reliability – to different domains? I doubt it. But I grant that the value of the desiderata 
might differ from domain to domain. 
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Third, note also that Alstonian and relativistic pluralisms might have a common 
motivation, that is, to account for irresolvable disagreements. Thus the Alstonian might 
explain the gulf between internalists and externalists by pointing to their incompatible 
commitments to different epistemic desiderata. This is not the way Alston himself uses his 
pluralism. Alston is more concerned to explain away the disagreement between 
internalism and externalism: contrary to their initial self-conception, the two sides do not 
disagree over what one and the same concept of epistemic justification requires from us; 
they simply invoke different (and compatible) such concepts of epistemic justification. 
 
Fourth, epistemic relativism need not commit to the idea that fundamentally different 
epistemic systems are committed to incompatible epistemic desiderata. At least this is so 
if we specify epistemic desiderata at the level of generality that Alston’s original paper 
worked with. Epistemic relativism might also apply in cases where two epistemic 
communities (with their respective epistemic systems of principles) favor the same 
epistemic desiderata but apply them in different ways. Irresolvable epistemic 
disagreement can exist between two communities that both give great value to reliability 
as the central epistemic desideratum in a given domain. And yet, one community might 
favor reliability of predictions that allow us to minimize false positives, while another 
community might favor reliability of predictions that enable us to minimize false 
negatives.  
 
These are just some preliminary ideas. The matter clearly deserves an extended 
discussion elsewhere.4 
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